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The Lewd, the Rude and the Nasty, by Pekka Väyrynen. Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2013, 288 pages, ISBN: 9780199314751.
In The Lewd, the Rude and the Nasty, Pekka Väyrynen systematically ap-
plies the tools of philosophy of language and linguistics to the inves-
tigation of thick terms. The book is an outstanding example of meth-
odological accuracy, interdisciplinary stance, detailed arguments 
and clearly articulated theses. The bulk of Väyrynen’s proposal is the 
following: The evaluation that thick terms convey is not built into 
the lexical meaning of these terms, it arises from pragmatic mecha-
nisms, “as a function of our communicative and practical interests in 
discourses involving thick terms and concepts” (p. ix). The standard 
view on how thick terms and concepts are associated with evaluation 
is that they are inherently evaluative: Inherently Evaluative (IE) is 
the principle according to which “the meanings of thick terms and 
concepts somehow or other contain evaluation” (p. 9). Väyrynen’s 
thesis — which is per se one of the possible accounts of thick terms 
— has strong theoretical consequences, because it follows from his 
view that thick terms do not have the deep philosophical relevance 
that they are typically taken to have. Thick concepts and terms al-
legedly challenge the fact-value distinction, and — assuming that 
one endorses Inseparability, i.e. the idea that the evaluative and non-
evaluative contents of thick terms and concepts cannot be disentan-
gled (pp. 12 ff, 202 ff) — they also challenge noncognitivism and 
expressivism. However, Väyrynen argues, if one leaves aside IE, then 
thick concepts and terms do not play such a crucial role in evaluative 
thought and discourse.
In order to support his pragmatic thesis, Väyrynen discusses the 
main possible accounts of thick terms. He does not just explore the 
landscape of the theories that philosophers have actually put forward, 
but investigates all the relevant theoretical options, by going through 
their advantages and shortcomings. His overall strategy is the fol-
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lowing. By generalizing the principle of Grice’s Razor (Paul Grice, 
“Further notes on logic and conversation”, in Studies in the Way of 
Words, edited by Paul Grice, Cambridge, MA, 1989, 47-8), accord-
ing to which other things being equal, it is preferable to postulate 
conversational implicatures rather than multiplying senses and se-
mantic implicatures, Väyrynen claims that other things being equal, it 
is preferable to explain the evaluations associated with thick terms 
(T-evaluations) in terms of conversational implications rather than 
multiply senses and other semantic properties (p. 55). His challenge 
is — in a sense — to investigate and verify the “other things being 
equal” constraint.
The book is structured as follows: in Chapters I and II Väyrynen 
provides the necessary framework to develop his arguments. In 
Chapter I he introduces crucial notions, such as the problematic dis-
tinction between thick and thin — namely between purely evalu-
ative terms (like ‘good’ and ‘bad’) and terms that mix evaluation 
and description (like ‘lewd’, ‘courageous’, ‘brutal’, etc.). In Chapter 
II he discusses the notions of evaluation and meaning and assesses 
the definitory issue of what counts as thick concepts and terms. In 
particular, Väyrynen takes a term or concept T to be “evaluative in 
meaning if T-sentences of the form x is T entail, as a conceptual mat-
ter or in virtue of a semantic rule, that x is good in a certain way (…) 
or that x is bad in a certain way” (p. 34). Therefore, it is not enough 
for a term to convey evaluative content in order to count as “evalua-
tive”, as in principle any term could come to carry some evaluation 
in context.
Chapters III and IV are devoted to the discussion of semantic 
views, where Väyrynen argues against the idea that the T-evaluations 
are semantic entailments. In Chapter III, he presents phenomena 
such as Projection and non-Deniability of T-evaluations. The fact that 
the evaluation associated with thick terms projects out of semantic 
embeddings such as negation, antecedent of conditionals, question, 
modals, denials, etc., strongly suggests that T-evaluations are not 
truth-conditional components, nor they can be semantic entailments. 
In particular, if the unembedded occurrence of ‘lewd’ in (1) conveys 
an evaluative content that sounds like (7), all the following embed-
ded occurrences of ‘lewd’ and B’s denial in (6) convey the same T-
evaluation (please note that I changed the numbers in the examples):
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(1) Madonna’s show is lewd. (p. 70)
(2) Madonna’s show is not lewd. (p. 78)
(3) Is Madonna’s show lewd? (p. 64)
(4) Madonna’s show might be lewd. (p. 64)
(5) If Madonna’s show is lewd, tabloid press will go nuts. (p. 64)
(6)  A: Madonna’s show is lewd.
  B: No, it isn’t. (…) (p. 74)
(7) Overt displays of sexuality that transgress conventional 
boundaries are bad in a certain way. (p. 62)
Väyrynen observes these patterns for utterances involving ob-
jectionable thick terms, thick terms that convey an evaluation that 
speakers are not willing to endorse (typically, ‘lewd’, ‘chaste’, etc.). 
However, because in principle any thick term could be seen as objec-
tionable, Projection and non-Deniability data speak against a truth-
conditional analysis of thick terms in general (p. 56). Another argu-
ment against the semantic view, to which we will come back later 
on, is Defeasibility, according to which T-evaluations can be con-
textually suspended without infelicity or contradiction. According 
to Väyrynen, a lewd-objector who wants to reject the T-evaluation 
conveyed by (1), can do that by uttering (8) or (9):
(8) Whether or not Madonna’s show is lewd, it’s not bad in any 
way distinctive of explicit sexual display. (p. 70)
(9) Whether or not Madonna’s show involves explicit sexual dis-
play, it would be in no way bad for that. (p. 70)
Väyrynen takes (8) as a felicitous and literal use of ‘lewd’ that 
fails to convey a negative evaluation. He denies that there is a con-
trast between (8) and (9), where (8) is strikingly less felicitous than 
(9). If Väyrynen is right about this case, then T-evaluations are in 
fact defeasible.
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In Chapter IV, Väyrynen discusses some alternative explanations 
of the data presented in Chapter III (Projection, non-Deniability, 
Defeasibility) and argues for the superiority of his own treatment. 
So far, Väyrynen’s arguments only target a truth-conditional analysis 
of thick terms and leave open the possibility for T-evaluations to be 
analysed in terms of other semantic properties different from entail-
ment (such as presuppositions).
Chapters V and VI are dedicated to discard such further seman-
tic approaches, present various pragmatic theories and argue in fa-
vour of Väyrynen’s own version of a pragmatic approach. Väyrynen 
characterizes T-evaluations as pragmatic implications of utterances 
featuring thick terms, typically not-at-issue: they usually are not rel-
evant to the main point of the conversation at hand. Certain con-
versational moves can nevertheless make these not-at-issue contents 
at-issue and therefore T-evaluations can be challenged when they 
are not backgrounded (p. 127). In Chapter V, the author discusses 
some general psycho-social principles that are taken to explain how 
T-evaluations conversationally arise as pragmatic implications. It is 
crucial for Väyrynen to explain why T-evaluations are so systemati-
cally associated with thick terms, given that for him evaluations are 
not built into the meaning of thick terms. He does so by appealing to 
the principle of Parochiality, according to which “The application of 
a thick term or concept tends to derive its point or interest from the 
term’s or concept’s relation to the evaluative perspective reflected in 
its application” (p. 128). The idea is that because a community typi-
cally shares a background moral perspective or practice, a certain 
linguistic expression can get routinely associated with a not-at-issue 
content, which gets triggered in all ordinary contexts as part of the 
default interpretation of the linguistic expression.
In Chapters VII and VIII, Väyrynen assesses some issues that 
scholars typically take to favour the IE approaches over pragmatic 
ones and argues that, on the contrary, they can be accounted for 
by his theory. In particular, Chapter VII is dedicated to the prob-
lem of extension. Philosophers have argued that it is a distinctive 
feature of the evaluative that linguistic meaning underdetermines 
extension; given that the extension of thick terms and concepts is 
underdetermined, then T-evaluations must be part of the meaning of 
thick terms. Väyrynen rejects the argument by acknowledging that 
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the extension of thick terms and concepts is underdetermined while 
arguing that this feature can be explained in terms of certain general 
features of gradable and context-dependent expressions, indepen-
dently of whether the expressions at stake involve evaluative con-
tents or not. In Chapter VIII he discusses other two allegedly pro-IE 
issues: Shapelessness and Inseparability. Shapelessness amounts to 
the idea that “The extensions of evaluative terms and concepts aren’t 
unified under independently intelligible nonevaluative relations of 
real similarity” (p. 190). One interpretation is that to be shapeless 
with respect to the nonevaluative dimension is what is distinctive of 
the evaluative; therefore the fact that thick terms and concepts are 
shapeless with respect to the nonevaluative dimension would reveal 
that they are inherently evaluative. Väyrynen’s strategy to reject this 
argument is again to show that shapelessness is not in fact distinc-
tive of the evaluative: He provides many such examples of similarly 
shapeless non-evaluative psychological notions. Moreover, he consid-
ers Inseparability, the thesis according to which “Thick terms and 
concepts are or represent irreducible fusions of evaluation and non-
evaluative description; these aspects cannot be “disentangled” from 
one another” (p. 204). Väyrynen rejects Inseparability by relying 
in part on Simon Blackburn’s point that the objectability of certain 
terms and concepts makes Inseparability implausible, as for Insepara-
bility one could not conceptually separate evaluative and nonevalua-
tive content (Simon Blackburn, Ruling Passions, Oxford, 1998).
In Chapter IX Väyrynen employs an opposite strategy to the one 
adopted in Chapters VII and VIII: he presents an argument typically 
taken against IE and argues that many theories endorsing IE can actu-
ally account for it. His set of arguments against IE is therefore not su-
perfluous. The issue at stake is Variability, according to which thick 
terms and concepts are contextually variable with respect to the va-
lence of T-evaluations. Prototypical instances of Variability would be 
cases like the following:
(10) The carnival was a lot of fun. But something was missing. It 
just wasn’t lewd. I hope it’ll be lewd next year. (p. 221)
The term ‘lewd’, instead of carrying its typical negative evalu-
ation, seems to convey a positive one. However, according to 
Väyrynen, (10)-like examples are problematic to IE only if they 
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are analysed as literal uses of thick terms. On the contrary, they do 
not challenge the idea that the relation between thick terms and 
evaluation is systematic and stable if they are analysed in terms of 
non-literal uses of language, “a way of mocking the sorts of prud-
ish evaluations that lewd conveys as a matter of meaning” (p. 224). 
This kind of account, suggested by Blackburn (Simon Blackburn, 
Ruling Passions, Oxford, 1998, 103) has interesting relations with 
some research conducted by Jesse Harris and Christopher Potts on 
perspectival shift concerning expressives and appositives (Jesse Har-
ris and Christopher Potts, “Perspective-shifting with appositives and 
expressives”, Linguistics and Philosophy 32 (6), 2009, 523-52) and to 
Bianchi’s analysis of appropriated uses of slurs in terms of irony and 
echo (Claudia Bianchi, “Slurs and appropriation: An echoic account”, 
Journal of Pragmatics 66, 2014, 35-44). The underlying idea in these 
apparently unrelated works is that evaluatives involve a perspective 
and this is typically the speaker’s one, but, by employing the relevant 
pragmatic mechanisms, one can succeed in shifting this perspective 
from the speaker’s one to another party’s one. However, regardless 
of whether Väyrynen favours the “non-literal” account, Variability 
does not suffice to knock down IE because it can be in principle 
explained in terms of pragmatic mechanisms. Therefore, because IE 
can account for Variability, other arguments against IE are needed to 
discard the approach.
In Chapter X — the last — Väyrynen completes his deflationary 
project, by arguing that, in the light of his pragmatic analysis, thick 
concepts and terms actually lack strong philosophical implications 
with respect to issues such as the fact-value distinction and the cog-
nitivism/non-cognitivism debate.
Let us now consider the negative contribution of The Lewd, the 
Rude and the Nasty, namely the arguments against the claim that thick 
terms lexically encode evaluations. Väyrynen considers two main 
arguments: Variability and Defeasibility. As we have just seen, Vari-
ability is set aside because instances of Variability à la (10) can be ana-
lysed as non-literal uses of language. The strongest argument against 
IE is therefore Defeasibility, namely the idea that T-evaluations can 
be contextually suspended without infelicity or contradiction. All 
in all, a reader might harbour doubts about the fact that the main 
argument against IE is based on Defeasibility, which is supported in 
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the book by a quite small set of examples and which relies on the as-
sumption that there is no significant contrast in felicity between (8) 
and (9), an intuition that is not so obvious. However, if one accepts 
the generalization of Grice’s razor (according to which, other things 
being equal, it is preferable to analyse T-evaluations in terms of prag-
matic implications rather than appealing to semantic notions), for 
Väyrynen’s main thesis to go through, it would suffice to show that 
the pragmatic account can in principle account for all the relevant 
phenomena, without relying on the Defeasibility data.
On the other hand, Väyrynen’s positive contribution — the de-
flationary thesis according to which T-evaluations arise from conver-
sational mechanisms — would have in a way profited from a more 
detailed discussion of what pragmatic implications are taken to be. 
Väyrynen talks about “generalized pragmatic implications” that are 
different from the well-known gricean implicatures, and he appeals 
to general communicative and practical interests, but it is not en-
tirely fleshed out how to fully characterize such implications and 
systematically distinguish them from generalized implicatures. The 
under-determination of the notion of ‘pragmatic implication’ might 
be partly due to the fact that for Väyrynen thick terms are not homo-
geneous enough to allow a uniform analysis and different mechanisms 
can be at play each time a T-evaluation arises.
As to how to best characterize such mechanisms, a comparison 
with pragmatic and deflationary accounts of pejoratives might come 
in handy. In the literature on slurs, scholars developed various ac-
counts to explain how certain terms can systematically be associ-
ated with evaluative contents, without these contents being lexically 
encoded. For instance, Bolinger (Renée Bolinger Jorgensen, “The 
pragmatics of slurs”, Noûs 50 (3), 2015) talks about “contrastive pref-
erences ”, Nunberg (Geoffrey Nunberg, “The social life of slurs”, in 
New Work on Speech Act, edited by Daniel Fogal, Daniel Harris and 
Matt Moss, Oxford, Oxford University Press, forthcoming) relies 
on gricean conversational manner implicatures, Rappaport (Jesse 
Rappaport, “Communicating with slurs”, manuscript) appeals to the 
relevance-theoretic notion of ‘showing’ (as opposed to ‘meaning’). 
While appealing to different notions, all these approaches aim to 
characterize the evaluative content of pejoratives as stable and nev-
ertheless non-encoded. I conclude by suggesting that these kinds of 
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proposals from the literature on pejoratives provide some interesting 
insights as to how to flesh out a pragmatic analysis of the evaluative 
content of thick terms. Väyrynen himself suggested a comparison 
between his view on thick terms and the analysis of slurs put forward 
in Bolinger’s proposal in a talk (Pekka Väyrynen, “Evaluatives and 
pejoratives”, Handout for Linguistics Seminars-Scuola Normale Superiore, 
Pisa, 2016). I shall add that also Nunberg’s and Rappaport’s propos-
als are very relevant in this respect.
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Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness 
of Our Believing, by Duncan Pritchard. New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 2016, 239 pages, ISBN: 9780691167237.
Duncan Pritchard’s new book constitutes a continuation of his re-
search into the problem of scepticism. It is a version of a series of 
lectures he gave at Soochow University in Taiwan in 2013 and an 
amendment to the theory contained in his previous book: Epistemo-
logical Disjunctivism (Oxford, 2012).
Pritchard’s diagnosis is that the source of scepticism is not an in-
consistency ingrained in our pre-philosophical intuitions; instead, he 
thinks that illegitimate ways in which those intuitions have been inter-
preted philosophically are what give rise to scepticism. His purpose 
is therefore to purge our intuitions of philosophical distortions and in 
this way to remove the threat of radical scepticism, which manifests 
itself through epistemic angst: the fear that there is in fact no knowledge 
of the external world. Pritchard analyses and attempts to respond to 
the two sceptical paradoxes which allegedly cause epistemic angst: 
the first is based on the principle of underdetermination; the second, 
on the principle of closure. Each of these paradoxes is formed of an 
inconsistent triad of claims. Pritchard’s formulation of the sceptical 
paradox based on underdetermination is as follows (p. 32):
